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European Union has been harmonizing intellectual property rights (IPRs) legislation for over a 
decade. Harmonized business regulation is thought to be necessary for well functioning internal 
markets. Regional legal barriers and uncertainty about regulation in general may increase 
transaction costs and cause market failures. Yet it is anything but certain that the new Eastern 
European member states would benefit from common market regulation. We argue that 
harmonization benefits status quo, i.e. merely protects the interests of incumbents, before offering 
equal opportunities for new entrants. This trend is most visible in the regulation of rapidly evolving 
information technology industry. Therefore, we use the intellectual property rights regulation of 
software as an example. 
We first describe shortly the most relevant IPR regulation of software in Europe: directive 
91/250/EEC on legal protection of computer programs (Software Copyright Directive), directive 
2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society (EUCD), and finally the proposal 2002/0047 for a directive on the patentability 
of computer-implemented inventions (Software Patents Directive). Special attention is given to 
sections having direct relevance to the competitiveness of the relevant fields, e.g. how these 
directives form entry barriers to new entrants. 
Then we proceed to explain the background motives and legislative proceeding of the regulation. 
Here we use public choice theory as a theoretical framework. We will demonstrate how the current 
legislative process has favoured incumbents who have enough resources to lobby effectively in 
Brussels and also in the member states. We conclude that the current regulation regime is not likely 
helpful for the competitiveness of the industry and the biggest harm will be caused to the new 
member states, which can not delay the implementation of the Directives as the current member 
states have done to give more time for their industries to adapt. 
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1.  Introduction 
The laws regulating intellectual property rights (IPRs) form one of the regulative corner 
stones of the information society. Thus,  it is not very surprising that also European 
Community has been lately very active trying to harmonize the rules in this area. At the 
same time, we should remember that IPRs are actually one of the earliest area of law, in   2 
which harmonization has taken place at a global level.
1 The reason behind increasing 
harmonization processes at different regional levels is relatively simple: IPRs have to be 
mutually recognized to be effective. A relatively new trend is, however, that IPRs are part 
of trade policies and political agreements. Yet again the reason can be traced to the 




1.1 Harmonization in European Union 
 
1.1.1. Copyright 
The 1988 Green Paper on “Copyright and the Challenge of Technology” was the starting 
point for copyright harmonization in Europe. The main goal of the Green Paper was to 
identify those areas, where the copyright laws of EU Member States should be harmonized 
so as to remove all unnecessary barriers from the European Union single markets. Six 
separate areas were identified in need of harmonization and European Commission 
subsequently considered five of these areas requiring prompt action. 
A determined political process followed and as a result the directives for legal protection of 
computer programs (1991), rental rights, lending rights and the main neighbouring rights 
(1992), satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (1993), the duration of protection of 
authors’ rights and neighbouring rights (1993), and the legal protection of databases (1996) 
were created. These directives have now been implemented into national laws in all EU 
member states. The sixth directive is the Directive on the Artists' Resale Right, which has 
been much more controversial than the other directives. After five years of lengthy heated 
discussions, it was finally adopted on 2001.  
The work did not end here. A first draft of a more ambitious Directive on copyright and 
related rights in the Information Society (EUCD) was introduced by the Commission in 
                                                 
1 The first patent treaty is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which dates back to 
March 20th, 1883. The first international copyright treaty, which is still in force, is the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which was signed September 9th, 1886.  
2 For more detailed discussion about the background, see May 2000 and Maskus 2000.   3 
December 1997. Unlike the earlier directives, which had been focused on relatively narrow 
areas, EUCD covered a wide range of issues. EUCD will be analyzed in more detail in 3.1 
 
1.1.2 Patents 
Interestingly, the process of patent harmonization has been less successful than copyright 
in spite of patents are traditionally considered to be a fundamental part of trade policy. One 
could argue that the need for EU-level harmonized regulation has been more limited 
because the harmonization has already taken place through the Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents (EPC), signed in 1973, which established the European Patent Office. 
(EPO 2001). As a result of EPC the patent system in Europe is already relatively uniform. 
Nevertheless certain questions were left open in EPC
3 and as a result the legal status of 
software and biotechnical patents varies from one country to other, which may be 
considered harmful for the single market. To partly solve this problem, Commission issued 
first in October 1996 the Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. 
This directive has been very controversial and only a minority of member states have 
implemented it at the moment. -- The new member states are still required to implement 
the Directive. 
Commission has recently published the Directive on the patentability of computer-
implemented inventions (February 2002), which is aimed to remove national differences in 
patent application concerning software patents. Also this Directive has b een debated, 
which we explain in detail in 3.2. 
In any case, the most ambitious legislative project so far in the field of patents has been the 
community patent. The idea here is not to replace (at least in the first stage) EPO but 
instead to create a new  system, in which the patent applicant can get a European Union 
wide patent with one application without multiple filings and language translations.
4 
Community patent has received rather strong opposition from most member countries. 
Giving up native languages in patent applications might create formal as well as practical 
problems to smaller member countries. How can one assume that companies and 
                                                 
3 Another problem is that there is no unifying structure with binding effect on national courts and there is 
therefore the potential for differences to appear over the interpretation of particular aspects of patent law 
4 The translation costs are often the biggest cost of the EPO patent application. This makes patenting much 
more expensive in EU than in the USA, which enjoys the benefits of one single official language.   4 
individuals in a particular language region have identical possibilities to get knowledge of 
patents only available in one or two major Western European languages? Are the courts in 
that language region capable and legally allowed to judge cases based on only foreign 
language materials?      
 
1.3. TRIPS 
It is important to remember, that at the same time EU was working with the Directives, it 
was also putting the same agenda forward in international forums. Starting as a loose 
initiative the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
finally resulted in 1994 as substantive requirements to strengthen both the copyright and 
patent protection of software.
5 TRIPS is part of World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 
complex treaty-package and used as the main tool used in harmonize especially the 
enforcement of IPRs at a global level. Unlike the other IPR-treaties, TRIPS has also very 
effective sanctions against countries, which do not fulfil their obligations. In practice, these 
sanctions are typically different trade restrictions like punitive tariffs. (Las Das 1998 pp. 
129-137) 
TRIPS regulates seven  areas of IPRs, namely copyright, trademarks, geographical 
indicator, industrial design, patents, layer-designs of integrated circuits, and trade secrets. 
The agreement sets minimum levels of protection in the covered areas. For example, all 
fields of technology have to be patentable with only two possible exceptions: 1) human and 
animal treatment methods (diagnostic, surgical) and 2) plants and animals and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants and animals.
6  (WTO, 2003) This almost 
unlimited patenting was under intense but futile opposition from the developing countries. 
They saw clearly that it would mean the end of their production of cheap general drugs in 
their countries, but the resistance could not overcome the aggressive lobbying from the 
United States.
7 (Drahos, Braithwaite 2002, p.146) 
                                                 
5 The original idea of adding a treaty about IPRs under WTO umbrella came from the United States, but EU 
was backing the process very strongly after it managed to secure its goal (Drahos, Braithwaite 2002, p 137-
146.) 
6 In other words, patent protection is not required for copulating animals but different methods for artificial 
insemination should already be patentable. 
7 What they did not realize at that point, is would possibly also cause the same effect in information products.   5 
In the field of software, the most relevant TRIPS articles require that software should be 
treated as literally work under copyright law and that software should be patentable as well 
(Lea 200, p. 152). There are essentially no requirements for exemptions to less developed 
countries. This suggests that the acquisition costs of software in less developed countries as 
well as barriers to entry to international markets have risen significantly. In o rder to 
compete on global markets, any would-be market participant must in the first place license 
a substantial amount of copyrights and prepare a patent portfolio to defend its position.  
 
2. The Economic Rationale of IPRs 
Most societies accept, for the  time being, that economic growth is a key element for 
societal development. Similarly innovativeness has been seen as the main driving force for 
economic growth. Schumpeter was among the first economists to link economic progress 
to the contribution of creative entrepreneurs (Schumpeter 1942). A “logical” conclusion 
from this basis is quite often that stronger IPRs result in more innovativeness and increased 
social development in the society.  
The conclusion, however, is not universally accepted; it is mostly used in the rhetoric of 
trade organisations like Business Software Alliance (BSA) and other interest groups close 
to the IPR owners industries. The academic research has constantly voiced scepticism over 
one-eyed view of IPRs and numerous efforts have been conducted to get some verifiable 
conclusions. Some economists stress the general economic problems of state intervention 
(IPRs are regulative monopolies), others admit that IPRs may be needed to create markets 
but criticize the ill functioning and non-efficient property rights distribution (the current 
rights distribution favours IPR industry).  
In a landmark article, Kenneth J. Arrow gave the reasons why perfect competition might 
fail to allocate resources optimally in the case of invention and IPRs might be needed: 
  "We expect a free enterprise economy to under invest in invention and research 
(as compared with an ideal), because it is risky, because the product can be 
appropriated only to a limited extent, and because of increasing returns in use. 
This underinvestment will be greater for the more basic research." (Arrow 1962, p. 
15)  
Douglas Clements belongs to the first category of critics. He summarises the recent critical 
economic discussion in his article “Creation Myths” (Clements 2003). His conclusion is 
that the scholars criticising the current scope of IPRs may have a case, the public good   6 
nature of innovations possibly does not justify the current system because “attendant 
damages of inefficiently high prices, low quantities, and stifled future innovation” may 
overweight the benefits.  
Scalise analyses the question from different angle in his book “Intellectual Property 
Protection Reform” (1999). He essentially accepts Arrows basis and goes on to argue that 
the level of optimal IPRs depends heavily on the level of economic development of the 
country. Obviously, in less developed countries the rules should be more flexible and not 
globally uniform in contrast to the main ideals behind the IPR harmonization efforts. The 
USA is actually a good example of this; the country has been very selective while 
choosing, which IPRs its protecting at a certain point of its development into an 
information society. (See for example: Nowell-Smith 1968, pp. 64-85) . 
 
2.1 Copyright 
Watt (2000) has recently surveyed the economic theory of copyright written during the last 
couple of decades. Research has been able to show that unauthorized copies of copyrighted 
works do not cause direct financial costs to the copyright holder. The economic harm 
materialises mainly in opportunity costs and negative externalities. Accordingly, the basic 
idea of an efficient copyright law is to ensure that these costs do not prevent the author to 
receive adequate compensation for the invested time and resources. At the same time, 
copyright increases the costs of new works because most of creations are bases on existing 
works. Copyright protection also raises, often significantly, the cost of the users of the 
copyrighted works. (Watt 2000, pp. 11-15). 
As Landes and Posner (1989) formulate in their classic article: 
“For copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines 
must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits from creating additional works 
minus both the losses from limiting access and the cots of administrating copyright 
protection” 
The recent literature takes also some other questions into account. For example, Liebowitz 
(2002) argues that those cases, where the “indirect appropriability”
8 is possible, the 
                                                 
8 The term means basically situation, in which the price of the work can higher for those copies, which will 
be used for unauthorised copying.    7 
copyright harms can be ameliorated. He also raises three other situations, in which the 
unauthorised copying may not be harmful for the owner of the copyright. First obvious one 
is a person, who would not have purchased the product even if the copying had been 
impossible. Another one is “exposure effect”. The copyright holder gets actually more 
sales because the unauthorised copies work as free advertisement for his other works or 
services. The third case is strong network externalities. A typical example of this could be 
office software, which value rises for all users if more people are locked into its file 
formats. (Liebowitz 2002, p. 149).  
 
2.2. Patents 
The economic theory on patents is more ambiguous. Some authors build theories on 
investment in innovative activity where results are assumed to be measurable in the 
volume of patenting activity. In short, investment results in a patent(s), which equals 
innovation. If the return from innovation is greater than the costs of investment and 
patenting, investment naturally pays off. 
More sceptical authors point out that in practise, especially in the software sector, 
innovative activity has little if nothing to do with patents. Instead, patents are mainly an 
additional administrative cost to company R&D and therefore an unfortunate example of 
an inefficient state intervention.  For example, Bessen and Maskin (2002) found practically 
no evidence that the software patenting would have had increased the R&D spending in 
United States during the time the software patents were gradually allowed.  
Another line of argumentation has been focusing on the information revelation that occurs 
during the patenting process and the benefits what the society gets from this. However, 
Boldrin and Levin (2003) take an opposing view. They argue that revenge engineering can 
be socially valuable and that there is actually much more narrow area, in which patenting is 
beneficial than generally it is thought. Yet another thing is that in the field of software, the 
patents do not necessary reveal anything, which is useful for actual programming and thus 
the argument for spreading the useful knowledge is possibly moot.
9 
                                                 
9 EPO does not require source code in the patent applications. For example Linus Torvalds has rather strong 
views on this: “I do not look up any patents on _principle_, because (a) it's a horrible waste of time and (b) I 
don't want to know.  The fact is, technical people are better off not looking at patents. If you don't know what 
they cover and where they are, you won't be knowingly infringing on them.”   8 
 
3. The Directives 
We are next going to go through the most relevant directives from the perspective of 
software industry. In each of the cases we explicate first the process and secondly the 
outcome. In the end we use public choice theory or more exactly the rent-seeking to 




3.1.1. Legislative Process 
The Parliament has been subjected to unprecedented lobbying onslaught on this 
Directive, and I regret that some of the parties concerned strived to obtain nothing 
less than total victory, using sometimes highly emotive arguments, rather than 
seeking a balanced compromise between the various legitimate interests involved. 
That is not the European way - to move forward we all have to be prepared to 
accept compromise and I congratulate the Parliament for having done so. 
(Bolkestain 2001) 
As can been seen from the quote above, the fight on copyright directive was very ugly. To 
simplify the matters a bit, the parties were content industry on the one side and the 
telecommunication industry and library associations on the other. At the time, consumer 
organisations did not play any major role and there were no EU-level cyber-rights 
organisations in effect (Oksanen, Välimäki 2002).  
 
3.1.3. The Content 
At the first look EUCD should not have any effects on software. Directive’s preamble 
states: 
(50) Such a harmonised legal protection does not affect the specific provisions on 
protection provided for by Directive 91/250/EEC. In particular, it should not apply 
to the protection of technological measures used in connection with computer 
programs, which is exclusively addressed in that Directive.    9 
In practise, the claim that EUCD would not affect software copyright is untrue. EUCD may 
not apply to “whole” computer programs as copyrighted works but instead it regulates the 
essential functionality of software. Arguably the most important part of EUCD, the legal 
protection of technical protection measures (TPMs), applies also to software as long as it is 
used as a tool for creating TPMs. This dual nature of software of being a work itself and a 
gatekeeper to other works gives content owners more to choose between different 
protection alternatives. It is rather trivial to add other protected works inside a software 
product and, moreover, practically all TPMs are implemented with software. 
TPMs enjoy very strong protection. The circumvention is never allowed for individuals. 
The governments may take action against the works, which do not permit circumvention 
for the limited exemptions stated in article 5 – at least in theory. The so-called E -
Commerce Safety Clause (Article 6.4.4) forbids even this limited governmental veto-right 
for the works, which are being sold in digital form. This will be most likely the 
predominant distribution method for digital works in the future and thus there won’t be any 
exemptions. 
 
3.2. Software Copyright Directive 
 
3.2.1. Legislative Process 
The software copyright directive raised also some waves during the legislative process. 
Different compared to EUCD was, that this time there were two more or less equally 
strong parties fighting against each other. A number of dominant American companies of 
that era (Microsoft, IBM, Apple, Lotus etc.) established Software Action Group for Europe 
(SAGE), which was aiming to get as stringent law as possible to curtail the European 
competition. They were lobbying to add uses interfaces under the scope of copyright and, 
perhaps more importantly, trying to ban reverse engineering altogether.  
To counter this threat, the European software industry (Amstrad, Bull, Olivetti and Fujitsu 
from Japan) formed European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS), which was 
aiming to secure an open competitive environment. The group received some mixed 
support from the academic community.  
The Commission sided with SAGE and made a proposal, which would have made it nearly 
impossible to create interoperable software. The European Parliament choose to support   10 
ECIS and adopted a substantial set of amendments to the proposed Directive, including 
three key amendments dealing with the interface and reverse engineering issues. Finally 
the Council of Ministers drafted a fine-balanced compromise. 
 
3.2.2. Content 
The most important part of the Directive is without a question Article 6, which defines the 
right of decompilation. The Article requires that in order the be legal, the following six 
requirements have to be met: 1) The acts are performed by the licensee or by another 
person having a right to use a copy of a program, or on their behalf by a person authorized 
to so. 2) The information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been 
readily available. 3) The acts are confined to the parts of the original program, which are 
necessary to achieve interoperability. 4) The information may not be used for goals other 
than to achieve the interoperability of the independently created computer program. 5) The 
information may not be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of 
the independently created computer program. 6) The information may not be used for the 
development, production or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its 
expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright.   
The final version does not state anything about the user interfaces, which was a clear win 
for ECIS. This is also in line with the outcomes of a few high profile court cases (Lotus vs. 
Borland etc), which took place more or less at the same time in the USA. 
 
3.3 Proposed Software Patent Directive 
 
3.3.1 Legislative Process 
The debate on software patenting has been going on for a while. It took place earlier 
around EPO’s practices but lately the EU-activity on the field has drawn most of the 
attention. The first hearing on possible EU-directive started in October 2000. (DG Internal 
Market 2000). The Commission received most likely more responses than what they 
expected. The European Free / Libre and Open Source Software movement (FLOSS-
movement) rallied behind the EuroLinux Alliance and as a result The Commission 
received a total of nearly 1450 responses before the closing date. Out of these responses, 
approximately 1200 were in line with EuroLinux Alliance’s position. On the other hand   11 
only 114 responses were clearly in favour of software patenting, but these included the 
biggest industry groups like EICTA and UNICE.
10 (PbT Consultants 2001) 
After the consultation the Commission came out with the proposal for the Directive, which 
was, at least in theory, more l imiting than the current EPO practice. The commission 
argues that they have taken account the results from the consultation: 
The objective is to achieve the right balance between making patents available 
where appropriate in order to reward and encourage innovation, while avoiding 
stifling competition and open source development. The Commission received some 
submissions arguing that patents tend to restrict innovation in fields like software 
development. We also received submissions from organisations representing many 
thousands of companies arguing that computer-implemented inventions should 
remain patentable or even that patentability should be extended. The Commission’s 
proposal reflects the balanced interests of the EU’s economy and society as a 
whole. (DG Internal Market 2002) 
The proposal was considered to be not enough far-reaching in the Council of Ministers and 
they made amendments, which would make the Directive in line with the EPO practice. 
The directive is currently in the European Parliament. So far the Committee on Industry, 
External Trade, Research and Energy and Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the 
Media and Sport have given their Opinions and both of these are more sceptical towards 
patenting than the Commissions proposal. JURI, which  has the biggest influence to the 
outcome has not yet given its opinion and the lobbying is currently pinpointed to the 
MEPs, which are the members of that Committee. 
 
3.3.2 Content 
The content of the directive is currently still open. The main question here is whether 
computer programs should be patentable as a product or as a process or even not at all 
without a hardware component. Currently the European Patent Convention does not allow 
software patents “as such”, which means that the software innovation h as to have a 
technical contribution in order to be patentable. In practise this does not limit software 
                                                 
10 Academic Institutions 4, Industry Associations 16, IPR Associations 19, Governmental organisations 13, 
Large Industry 15, IPR Professionals 18, SME 9, Individual Software Developer 1, Individuals of unknown 
type 19. One might argue that the group represents rather well the most likely beneficiaries.    12 
patenting. Product patents (software on a CD-ROM etc.) are also allowed in EPO practise, 
but some of the national patent offices decline to accept them. 
 
3.4. Rent Seeking 
“Rent seeking consists of legitimate, non-voting actions that are intended to change laws or 
administration of laws such that one individual and/or group gains at the same or greater 
expense to another individual or group.” (Gunning 2003).  
We can find in all of the presented cases elements that fit in the Gunning’s definition. In 
each of the cases several parties had conflicting interests and the parties were trying to use 
lobbying to get the most favourable outcome from their perspective.  
There are also some interesting differences between the cases. In the case of EUCD, there 
was no real counter balancing force, which would prevent the rent seeking of content 
industry. The telecommunication companies were active, but their goals were limited to 
securing to the right to make temporary copies
11 and to the right not to be forced to 
implement any DRM systems. The library unions had also a narrow interest, which they 
managed to secure at least to a certain extent. Practically no-one was defending general 
public and to a lesser extent software SMEs, which both were arguable the biggest losers 
of the outcome. 
Software Copyright Directive was a classical example of a case, in which two powerful 
parties with opposite interests were engaged in a l obbying competition. The result was 
more or less a compromise without no clear winner except the society, which was better 
off (essentially by accident) compared to the situation, in which no reverse engineering is 
allowed  
The most interesting case is and will be Software Patent Directive. This time there are two 
coalitions, which have directly the opposite interests. The difference here is the nature of 
coalitions. The FLOSS-side is in much larger if we consider only the number of individual 
activists but the pro patent-side has much more economic power and also more experience 
on lobbying. The outcome is yet unclear but at the moment the pro-side has succeed better 
                                                 
11 The content industry demanded that even the technical copies, which have to be created to transfer the 
information in the Internet, are part of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. Needles to say that this 
would have meant the end of Internet as we know it.    13 
in processes, which are effectively controlled by civil servants (Commission and Council 
of Ministers) and FLOSS-side in the Parliament. 
The similar trend is interestingly visible in two other cases. For some reason the Parliament 
seem to be more resistant against the rent-seeking done by the supporters of the strong 
IPR-rights. This is an area, which requires further research.  
The idealistic view to democracy is that the decision makers try to consider the public 
good while making the decision. At least in analysed cases there is little to no evidence 
about this
12 and the outcomes seem to be dictated mostly by the composition of interest 
groups.  In case the IPRs, the potential benefits are very clear to small group of parties and 
they have therefore a reason to invest to lobbying. On the contrary the general public does 
not have a very easily demonstrated benefits from active participation and secondly the 
questions are often so complicated that even the experts cannot be sure what the different 
outcomes really means for the society at large.  
The experiences from the United States seem to support this view also. As Boldrin and 
Levine (2003) note: 
That public rent-seeking plays an important role in the acquisition of intellectual 
property is clear. The recent Sony Bono copyright extension law is a good case in 
point: the U.S. Congress unanimously  on a voice vote extended copyright 
retroactively by 20 years - yet there is no economic argument whatsoever in favour 
of retroactive extension of intellectual property. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Typically, as we have showed above, political processes of new IPR regulations in 
software have been prone to rent seeking. The outcome depends heavily on the involved 
parties. In case of the software the result is mixed.  
                                                 
12 For example, most of the decisions are done without having any real independent economic research as 
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Figure 1. Different protection layers for software 
 
As can been seen from the figure 1., software enjoys currently a rather strong protection, 
but it could be still even stronger without right to reverse engineering and right to mimic 
the user interfaces. An incumbent has to be still able to breach legally all the different 
layers of the protection if he wants to make a compatible product. If the IPR-protection is 
made correctly, this is practically impossible. This opens existing firms way to benefit 
from monopoly profits and thus get rid of low margins of truly open markets.  
This is exceptionally bad news for the “Eastern EU”, because the IT-sector is there 
currently comparatively weak. Now it has to face not only competition on creating useful 
and innovative products but also a very high legal risks related to IPRs. For example, if the 
EPO standard for software patenting prevails, it will mean that the costs for newcomers 
will be much higher because they cannot use existing patent portfolios for cross licensing. 
Of course, it is also possible that they cannot even obtain the required licenses for creating 
legal software. The figure 2 gives a glimpse on current situation, which clearly shows that 
the new member states are really going to have an uphill battle on this front. Especially, 
considering that the patents, which have been granted during the last few years, are going 
to be enforceable for next 15-20 years, which is a very long time in IT-sector.   15 
Likewise, digital rights management has a potential to become a major obstacle for market 
entry. Current DRM-standards are heavily protected by patents but even if this isn’t the 
case, the copyright law makes it anyway very hard to create interoperable systems.
13 
Taking all this into account, finally one question has to be asked. Why the new member 
states have not been more active in lobbying, because it should be clear that the current 
rules are definitely not optimal for incumbents. At least one partial answer might be that 
the persons who recognize the situation are also the persons who can gain personal benefit 
from the expanding IPR-rights. Still, this does not sound feasible enough to explain the 
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Figure 2. Number of patent applications to EPO per million inhabitants (source: Eurostat) 
 
 
                                                 
13 This problem is even bigger with open source products, which by definition cannot have effective DRM 
systems, which means that this otherwise very potential way to create competitive software is outlawed in 
some cases.   16 
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